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EGAL LINES IN SHIFTING SAND: 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11TH 
Daniel Kanstroom* 
Abstract:  In March of 2004, a group of legal scholars gathered 
at Boston C
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ollege Law School to examine the doctrinal 
mplications of the events of September 11, 2001. Their task 
o undertake serious rethinking of various existing categories and 
egal lines, especially those between citizens and noncitizens, 
ar and peace, the civil and criminal systems, and the borders of 
.S. territory. The hope was that through detailed thought and 
esearch, we would begin to understand the recent evolution of 
he rule of law—across lines and categories. 
The conference yielded exciting results. Partici
trices, these formal lines, are increasingly inadequate to 
ddress the complex issues raised by many current government 
ractices in the campaign known as the “war on terror.” 
Among the major issues considered were: the critical 
u lic’s right to know; the relevance of the certain habeas co
ractices used in the deportation system; racial profiling; the 
ncreasing convergence of immigration and criminal law since 
he September 11th attacks; the nature of judicial review of 
ilitary detentions at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere; and a 
omparative analysis of noncitizens’ rights in the U.S. and in the 
uropean Union. What has emerged is an outline for much future 
esearch and the seeds of a new, pragmatic legal approach to 
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increasingly complex questions that is grounded in deep respect 
for human rights.  
  
 
 
 
 
 The truism that we never forget where we were and what we 
re
s 
ing
 College 
w 
we  doing at the time of world-shaking events can be misleading. 
My memory of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for 
example, is highly personal and more emotional than rational: my 
mother’s tears, the seething, unfocused tension between children of 
different races in my urban school the next morning, and my 
teacher’s well-intentioned but inept attempts to help us grasp how 
we as a society had succumbed to the terrible veto of violence. 
 I do, however, remember exactly where I was and what I wa
do  when the planes hit the buildings in New York. The details re-
main clear not only because I am now an adult, but also because for 
me the whole episode was marked by a poignant combination of 
tragedy, fear, and—-astonishingly—a kind of epiphany. 
 I was teaching immigration law that semester at Boston
La School. Two weeks before September 11, my class and I had 
read and discussed the several late nineteenth century cases that 
form the foundation of what is known as the “plenary power doc-
trine.” We had struggled to conceptualize and articulate the limits of 
the government’s power to control noncitizens’ entry into and resi-
dence within the United States. Could it truly be, as the Supreme 
Court had once said in the infamous “Chinese Exclusion Case,” that 
government policies in this realm are “conclusive upon the judici-
ary?”1 What consequences might flow to us all if we accepted the 
proposition that the power of the government to “deport foreigners 
. . . is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent 
their entrance into the country”2? 
 On September 11, 2001 we had suspended discussion of these 
deep legal and policy concerns for a special session on legal re-
arcse h techniques. We had set up an internet connection, and its 
images were projected onto a large screen. I walked into the class-
room, completely oblivious to what had happened that morning, and 
                                                                                                               
1 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
2 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
2005] kanstroom 3 
was confronted by the stunned and horrified faces of the early arri-
vals as they watched CNN. Then, huddled together, about a hundred 
of us watched: students, staff, and faculty. At first, our fears were 
rather specific and personal—we believed that as many as fifteen of 
our students were on those planes, flying from Boston to California 
for job interviews. I recall nervously scanning the empty seats in the 
room. Who was missing? Who had told me of a trip to California? 
Many of us began to worry about friends and family as well. I thought 
that my brother was probably near, if not in the heart of, the disas-
ter—he worked very close to the World Trade Center. (I later learned 
that, amazingly, he had overslept that day and awoke in Brooklyn to 
see smoke rising over lower Manhattan.) Soon, however, we all real-
ized that we were witnessing something much bigger than we had 
initially thought. The world, it seemed, had suddenly changed in 
ways that the mind and the heart struggled to grasp. 
 I remember standing before this group as the events unfolded, 
elin
es to protect more than a thousand 
ars
fe g compelled to say something—to try to sum up, or at least to 
frame somehow, what we were witnessing. I knew I was inadequate 
to the task, but nevertheless it was mine. The first thought that oc-
curred to me has stayed with me ever since. I saw firefighters and 
police rushing into that huge inferno; medical emergency teams do-
ing whatever they could; stunned government officials struggling to 
do something useful—all were uncertain of what they faced, and all 
were terrified, shocked, confused—but all were doing their jobs. I 
said to my students that for us—lawyers, law students, especially 
those who devote our lives to human rights and the rule of law—our 
time would come soon to do the same thing. We would have to rush 
into a new, uncertain, complex, potentially dangerous situation and 
we would have to do our job. 
 That job, most simply put, is to construct a system, a discourse, 
and a legitimate set of procedur
ye  of legal culture and human rights, while not, as the Supreme 
Court once put it, turning the Constitution into “a suicide pact.”3 
 It has become apparent that this job requires serious rethinking 
of various categories and legal lines. Before September 11, 2001, 
meso  legal categories were fairly unambiguous. U.S. citizens, for 
example, unquestionably had powerful procedural and substantive 
rights against executive detention. With the rare and controversial 
exception of the detention of citizens during declared wars, one 
                                                                                                               
3 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159–160 (1963) 
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could have confidently said that the constitutionalized criminal justice 
system was the primary framework for analysis of such arrests and 
detentions.4 As the Supreme Court put it nearly half a century ago, 
[
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W]e reject the idea that when the United States acts 
gainst citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. 
he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. 
ts power and authority have no other source. It can only act 
n accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Consti-
ution. When the Government reaches out to punish a citi-
en who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and 
ther parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and 
iberty should not be stripped away just because he hap-
p
 A he rules have long been more 
mp
ens to be in another land.5 
s to noncitizens, however, t
co licated. After all, the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which au-
thorized the President to designate noncitizens for arrest, detention 
and removal without judicial process or oversight—were never tested 
at the Supreme Court. But it is also well-established that, if subjected 
to formal criminal process, noncitizens retain the same rights as citi-
zens in that process.6 If, however, they are placed in deportation 
proceedings—possibly implicating arrest, detention, and the most 
severe and harsh of consequences—their rights are substantially 
diminished and subject to the flexible vicissitudes of procedural due 
process analysis. Moreover, if they happen to face U.S. government 
action outside the United States, the Supreme Court has deemed 
them to have essentially no constitutional rights at all.7 All this was, 
of course, doubly true for so-called “enemy aliens” in times of war. 8 
 So, as a general matter, one could conceptualize the pre-
September 11th rule of executive detention/enforcement law as a 
                                                                                                               
4 Cf. Hendricks v. Kansas, 521 U.S. 346, 350138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 117 S. Ct. 2072 
(1997) (upholding Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act, providing for civil commitment 
of those who, due to “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” are likely to commit 
sexually predatory acts.) 
5 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). 
6 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
7 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, supra. 
8 el 
Kans rists: Defining the Rights of 
Nonc ngland Journal Of International Law, 
47–1
 See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 953 (2002); see also Dani
troom, From the Reign of Terror to Reining in the Terro
itizens in the Nation of Immigrants, 9 New E
08 (2003) [hereinafter: Reigning in the Terrorists]. 
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matrix with four major interlocking dichotomies composed of eight 
basic variables and creating a rough continuum of rights: 
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Although a far from perfect set of distinctions (and the relative  
we t of various factors always raised conceptual problems),9 it 
seemed a relatively stable one. The legal fallout from September 11, 
however, has necessitated serious rethinking of these lines and 
igh
categories.10 At least five current trends are discernible, some of 
which precede 9/11, but all of which have accelerated since: 
1.   the use of the immigration control system for security and 
other government purposes that do not relate directly to 
i
2.  t riminal justice and immigration con-
mmigration policy;11 
he convergence of the c
trol systems;12 
                                                                                                               
9 See e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (court-martial jurisdiction may not ex-
tend to non-military spouses outside of the continental United States during times of 
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e); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 787–88 (1950) (German nationals, con-
ined in the custody of the United States out side of U.S. territory following a conviction by 
 military commission have no right to a writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of their 
etention); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1945); Hirabayashi v. United 
tates, 320 U.S. 81, 92 (1943) (legislative and executive branch have the constitutional 
uthority to impose military laws with criminal sanctions that require both citizens and 
on-citizens of Japanese ancestry to report to and remain confined in military areas); Ex 
arte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 2 (1942) (per curiam) (U.S. citizenship not an impediment to 
ilitary trial of alleged Nazi saboteur); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235–37 (holding that non-
itizens subjected to criminal process retained the same rights as citizens). 
10 See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic 
oundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 North Carolina Journal Of In-
ernational Law and Commercial Regulation, 639–70 (2004) [hereinafter: Crim
B
t inalizing 
the Undo
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cumented]; Daniel Kanstroom, “Unlawful Combatants” in the United States: 
rawing the Fine Line Between Law and War, Human Rights 30: no.1 (Winter 2003): 18–
1 [hereinafter: Unlawful Combatants] 
11 See Kanstroom, Reigning in the Terrorists, supra. 
12 See Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented; see also, Daniel Kanstroom, 
eportation, Social Control, and PunishmD ent: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws 
Make Bad Cases, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1890, 1890–1935 (2000). 
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3. the breakdown of the peace/declared war dichotomy in the 
morphous “war on terror”; 
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 In March of 2004, a group of leading scholars gathered at Bos-
n C
o
ctr
4. the placement of great pressure on the legitimacy of the ter-
ritorial line in situations ranging from humanitarian interven-
ion to Iraq and detentions at Guantanamo Bay; and 
5. the assertion of executive power against U.S. citizens such 
as Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi in ways that call many ba-
ic rights-claims into question. 
to ollege Law School to consider these and related questions. An 
impressive range of expertise was in attendance: from U.S. constitu-
tional, immigration, and criminal law, to international human rights 
law and the developing law of the European Union. Presenters were 
invited to explore specific themes fitting within the broad rubric I have 
just sketched. Our hope was that through such detailed thought and 
research, we would begin to see and understand the most recent 
evolution of the rule of law —particularly across lines and categories. 
 The conference yielded remarkable and exciting results. 
Thr ughout the day, participants responded to this basic hypothesis: 
that these entrenched historical matrices, these formal lines, are in-
creasingly inadequate to address the complex issues raised by many 
current government practices in the  campaign known as the “war on 
terror.” 
 If that is correct, then what? I would advocate for less status-
sedba  categorization and a more basic human rights approach. This 
do inal method, of course, could be constructively combined with 
serious attention to structural constitutional analysis, as it was by the 
Second Circuit in its Padilla decision.13 But such structural analysis 
must also be informed by human rights discourse,14 specifically by a 
robust version of habeas corpus review that does not rely reflexively 
on distinctions such as that between law and discretion or that ac-
cepts a standard of review so deferential as to be functionally mean-
ingless. 
 Other participants provided what amounts to  a menu for future 
analysis of a vast array of fundamental issues that our legal system 
ust
                                              
m  reconcile in the years to come. 
                                                                 
13 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003). 
14 See Daniel Kanstroom, Brief for Amici Curiae Law Professors Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 
352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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 Democracies,” it has been said, “die behind closed doors.”15 
Thus, the article authored by Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea ad-
dresses a problem notable both for its complexity and high stakes. 
What exactly does the public have a “right to know” about the details 
of the war on terror? Professor Papandrea notes the government’s 
use of an array of “nontraditional methods” (a gentler term than I 
might have chosen) to “detain, process, and prosecute” individuals 
suspected of terrorist activities. And how relevant, if at all, is it that 
the administration has focused so zealously on noncitizens? Should 
we be reassured or alarmed by courts’ general deference to the Ex-
ecutive’s rather amorphous national security claims ? 
 Professor Papandrea wisely counsels courts to reca
“
ll the inter-
s est in effective self-government that motivated the 1966 passage of 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the judicial recognition of 
the First Amendment right of access in 1980.16 (To this I might add 
the symbolic point that the two dates frame the year of Watergate 
perfectly, seven years on each end.) In a wide-ranging and meticu-
lous analysis, her contribution notes how the public’s knowledge of 
the Guantanamo detainees and “enemy combatants” has been both 
“one-sided” and “woefully inadequate to scrutinize government ac-
tions.”17 This is unsurprising if one recalls, as does Professor Pa-
pandrea, that the political process has historically been “impotent 
and incapable of forcing disclosures of information the government 
prefers to keep secret.”18 
 But information is only one element of the question of where to 
draw such vital legal lines. How closely should courts scrutinize the 
yriam d of choices made by a government ostensibly pursuing its 
most important goal of basic national security? Here, articles by Pro-
fessors Stephen Legomsky, Nancy Morawetz, and Theresa Miller are 
instructive. Professor Legomsky considers one extraordinarily con-
troversial subject confronted in the “war on terror:” the legitimacy of 
ethnic and religious profiling. He focuses particularly on how profiling 
affects noncitizens, an undertaking complicated by the need to con-
sider the citizen/noncitizen line, as well as to resolve more general 
questions of deference to the government in national security mat-
ters. His keen analysis of this problem begins with a useful definition 
of profiling: “specifically targeting individuals who possess identifiable 
                                                                                                               
15 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).  
16 Papandrea at 2. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
8 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:1 
attributes that are believed to bear positive statistical correlations to 
particular kinds of misconduct.”19 As Professor Legomsky notes, this 
definition may sound innocuous, but post 9/11 profiling has been 
used quite strenuously against one particular group: “people who 
appear to law enforcement officials to be of Arab descent or Muslim 
(or both.).” He details many of these practices as applied to nonciti-
zens, ranging from intelligence-gathering and “voluntary interviews,” 
to detention, closed hearings and visa controls.20 The question thus 
arises whether such practices are either sensible or legal. As to the 
former, Professor Legomsky is dubious, but judicious. He asserts 
that law enforcement profiling is justifiable only “when two conditions 
are met.” First the practice must be “rational.” And second, “any 
gains in the efficacy or efficiency of the inspection process must be 
balanced against the substantial harm of government-sponsored dis-
crimination.”21 Professor Legomsky concludes that, although the 
rationality of such practices is contestable, “the more convincing ar-
guments . . . are those that recognize that ‘rational’ does not mean 
‘justifiable.’”22 He then meticulously considers the harms that flow 
from government-sponsored discrimination of this type. 
 Finally, he addresses a broader concern: the relationship be-
eetw n this practice and the requirements of international human 
rights law, particularly the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (the “Race Convention”).23 This convention, 
ratified by the United States in 1994 (albeit with substantial reserva-
tions, understandings, and declarations) “reflects the world’s shared 
understandings that racial discrimination is wrong and that collective 
international efforts to eradicate it are essential.”24 As Professor Le-
gomsky notes, the focus of many government actions on noncitizens 
raises special problems in this setting. Despite this, he nevertheless 
concludes that the citizen/noncitizen line is not a perfect nor a bright 
one, and that it is quite possible that some of the U.S. intelligence-
gathering strategies are “potentially vulnerable” to challenges under 
the Race Convention.25 
                                                                                                               
19 Legomsky at 1. 
20 Legomsky at 3–17. 
21 Legomsky at 20. 
22 Legomsky at 22. 
2 n on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
open , 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.) 
3 International Conventio
ed for signature Mar. 7
24 Legomsky at 26. 
25 Legomsky at 36. 
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 he connection between Professor Legomsky’s analysis and the 
work of Professors Nancy Morawetz and Theresa Miller is intriguing. 
Initially, little seems more arcane than the habeas corpus jurispru-
dence of the Federal District Court for the Western District of Louisi-
ana. And yet, Professor Morawetz demonstrates powerfully how this 
doctrinal black hole has tremendous significance to the thousands of 
noncitizens whose cases—and persons—are transferred to the re-
mote Oakdale Federal Detention Facility. Indeed, the issue of deten-
tion site selection proved critical to the Supreme Court’s disposition 
T
of the case of U.S. citizen Jose Padilla.26 The Court’s “seemingly 
technical ruling,” that Padilla’s lawyers had incorrectly filed a habeas 
etition in New York instead of South Carolina where he was held, is p
actually of “enormous importance,” asserts Professor Morawetz.27 In 
a fascinating and meticulous study of the rather bizarre practices of 
the Louisiana court in cases involving noncitizens, Professor 
Morawetz artfully transcends the citizen/noncitizen line and highlights 
“the grave dangers of extending the rule of Padilla beyond that case 
nd into any situation in which the government has the power to a
choose the situs of detention.”28 Perhaps most significantly for pur-
poses of future litigation, she emphasizes that the locus of habeas 
actions is an issue unrelated to subject matter jurisdiction, and the 
standard should be “relaxed where it would reward abuse by the 
government or otherwise fail to provide fair access to the writ.”29 
Otherwise, the power that has developed in immigration cases—the 
power to “move noncitizens to a law-free zone”—could extend much 
further.30 Ultimately, as Professor Morawetz points out, the experi-
ence of the noncitizens in Oakdale should “serve as a sober re-
minder of the degree to which substantive protection from illegal 
government action depends not just on substantive judicial rulings, 
but also on . . . procedural rules that will determine whether courts 
ever reach the merits of a case . . . .”31 Little in our post 9/11 jobs as 
legal professionals could be of greater import. 
                                                                                                               
26 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004.) 
27 Morawetz at 2. 
28 Morawetz at 3. 
29 Morawetz at 3. 
3 is is not to say that this power is not already a serious problem 
in its other problems, Oakdale detainees are subject to deportation 
prior f their cases. Id. at 18. 
0 Morawetz at 5. Th
 own right. Among 
 to the adjudication o
31 Morawetz at 21. 
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 Professor Theresa Miller examines the doctrinal line between 
criminal punishment and immigration law. She notes the powerful 
convergence of “get tough” policies in the criminal justice realm, the 
1996 changes to U.S. immigration, and the post-September 11 re-
gime. This connection—one to which I have devoted much attention 
as well—leads to the recognition that “the interaction of the two sys-
tems produced outcomes that were unprecedented, and even unin-
tentional at times, in their harshness.”32 Professor Miller moves from 
this point to examine three major theoretical responses to the con-
vergence between immigration and criminal law and finally to a most 
fruitful discussion of how “the new penology” blurs historical distinc-
tions among “illegal aliens,” “criminal aliens” and “terrorists.”33 Her 
wide-ranging article closes with a series of questions, perhaps the 
most poignant of which is: “To what extent is the nation made more 
secure when its alien population is subjected to harsh, criminally pu-
nitive sanctions for relatively minor criminal or immigration transgres-
sions?”34 As she notes with understatement, the bare contours of 
these questions are yet undefined, let alone any clear answers to 
them. 
 Noncitizens in Oakdale face a court that, according to Professor 
M wetz, “views itself as largely without power.”35 Historically, the 
territorial line has served as a classic justification for this phenome-
non of impotence, a fact undoubtedly informing the government’s 
decision to detain noncitizens at the U.S. naval bases at Guan-
tanamo instead of, say, lower Manhattan. Professor David Martin, a 
leading scholar of both immigration and human rights law, considers 
ora
the numerous issues raised by the case of Rasul v. Bush,36 which 
held that U.S. courts have jurisdiction over habeas claims from 
Guantanamo. Using aspects of the companion case to Rasul, Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld,37 Professor Martin assumes the complicated task of 
sketching out a specific method for the consideration of future chal-
lenges to detention in similar settings. In so doing, he does not rely 
on prior fixed categories such as citizenship or territory, but carefully 
considers instead the aspects of rights, pragmatism, and judicial le-
gitimacy implicated by various approaches. He describes his essay 
                                                                                                               
32 Miller at 3. 
33 Miller at 6. 
34 Miller at 45 (last page?). 
3 1. 5 Morawetz at 2
36 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
37 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
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as “an effort to bolster an emerging and workable middle ground.”38 
Although he concedes that his suggested method—in which primary 
factfinding would be done by military tribunals—might “disappoint 
some,” Professor Martin notes that it offers several rather powerful 
and underappreciated advantages, of which the most significant is 
possibly the enhancement of judicial review to consider de novo the 
validity of tribunal procedures and even the substantive standards for 
who is “an enemy combatant.”  
 Professor Martin begins with a careful consideration of the pre-
usvio  dominant precedent in the field, the Court’s 1950 decision in 
Johnson v. Eisentrager.39 He artfully analyzes Rasul v. Bush 40 and 
draws on “signals” from Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 41 to “use the judicial 
instrument carefully and cleverly, in order to maximize the chances 
that persons wrongfully detained can secure prompt release—while 
still making ample allowance for the real demands of military effec-
tiveness.” His focus on Part IV of Justice Jackson’s opinion in Eisen-
trager cleverly blends aspects of the three cases’ reasoning into one 
coherent theoretical whole. Among the most impressive features of 
Professor Martin’s work is his comprehensive analysis of mili-
tary/government/security concerns as well as the protection of hu-
man rights. After disaggregating the various rights claims that have 
been made, he appraises the role of courts in each domain.42 His 
conclusions are, he acknowledges, paradoxical. By means of analo-
gies from immigration law, he suggests—contrary to the stance of 
most human rights advocates—that deferential standards of review 
“give rise to a salutary form of acoustic separation that actually winds 
up bolstering a delicate but indispensable balance when the strong-
est of governmental needs comes into conflict with the most elemen-
tal individual liberty claims.”43 Whether one agrees with this ultimate 
conclusion or not, Professor Martin has crafted a most impressive 
recipe for future food for thought. 
 As we grapple with the complexities of the questions posed by 
each of these fine essays, we might do well to look beyond the 
iteUn d States for useful approaches to similar problems. French pro-
fessor of law, Sophie Robin-Olivier, thus considers the operation of 
                                                                                                               
38 Martin at 3. 
39 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
40 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
41 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
42 Martin at 27–28. 
43 Martin at 36. 
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the citizen/noncitizen line in the European Union’s counterterrorism 
efforts. Though noting “a general deterioration in the situation of im-
migrants on both sides of the Atlantic,” Professor Robin-Olivier con-
cludes that the lives of noncitizens in Europe have not changed as 
dramatically as have those of noncitizens in “the nation of immi-
grants.”44 To account for this divergence, she identifies the shared 
competence of the EU and its constituent Member States over both 
the fight against terrorism and immigration policies. Although Euro-
pean measures “ostensibly designed to fight terrorism . . . have 
pointedly targeted noncitizens,” Professor Robin-Olivier writes that 
aspects of the EU legal system, especially its robust and specific 
protections of human rights, may “limit or counterbalance the impact 
of anti-terrorism measures on noncitizens.”45 Such protections in-
clude measures that go far beyond the rights system existing in the 
United States, including, for example, acceptance of the legal argu-
ment that the “decision to expel . . . ” may constitute an “interference 
with the right to respect for family life” required by European human 
rights law.46 Professor Robin-Olivier also notes a report issued by 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that concluded 
that U.S. practices at Guantanamo Bay would not pass muster under 
European standards.47 Moreover, she considers the weight given in 
Europe to the principle of “nondiscrimination.” She strikes her most 
optimistic note in the final section of her essay, which considers the 
emerging idea of European citizenship and reflects on the potential 
for its universalist aspirations to  broaden acceptance of principles of 
equality and fundamental rights. 
 Hannah Arendt once described the period immediately preced-
ing  the Second World War as a time when, “the very phrase ‘human 
sright ’ became for all concerned—victims, persecutors, and onlook-
ers alike—the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-
minded hypocrisy.”48 The meticulous care taken by the authors of 
these essays , and by other presenters and attendees of this sympo-
sium, offers powerful support for a more optimistic view in this era. 
                                                                                                               
44 Robin-Olivier at 1. 
45 Robin-Olivier at 3. 
46 Robin-Olivier at 6. 
47 Robin-Olivier at 8. 
4 rigins of Totalitarianism 269 (1966). 8 Hannah Arendt, The O
